The York Politics Review

By Andrew Crellin

The Cambridge Dictionary definition of egalitarian is “believing that all people are equally important and should have the same rights and opportunities in life”. In its common usage,  to be an egalitarian is to also believe in reducing the social and economic inequalities in society. The work of political philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) perfectly fits this description of egalitarianism. This article presents two elements of his work which I believe are powerful tools for egalitarians engaged in public debate.

Much of Rawls’ work was justifying an egalitarian view of distributive justice. This came as answers to two questions: what principles of justice ought society to follow, and what is the proper justification of the principles of justice. The Two Principles of Justice are his answer to the first question: these state that all persons should have equal rights to basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity to positions in society, and call for arranging social and economic inequalities to maximally benefit the worst-off in society. His argument for the Two Principles is that they alone would be acceptable to all people in society- which is his answer to the second question. It is as part of this answer that he presents the famous ‘Original Position’ with its ‘Veil of Ignorance’- the idea that a just society is one governed by the principles of justice that we would choose if we did not know our social class, race, faith, gender, or other personal attributes. Rawls’ account, then, is thoroughly egalitarian- it presents principles of justice which call for equality in rights and opportunities, as well as less economic and social inequality than we see today, and it grounds these principles by their justifiability to all in society.

The question this article aims to answer is what the egalitarians of today can learn from one egalitarian of the past- Rawls. It answers with reference to two parts of his work: his fervent opposition to utilitarianism, and his view of natural talents and how it relates to justifiable inequality. These two ideas provide the potential for stronger arguments for egalitarian causes as well as powerful responses to their opponents. Of course, this article is not meant to be a thorough defence or description of Rawls’ work- both are projects too grand for a short article like this. This article instead addresses egalitarians engaged in public debate, and aims to supply some ideas they can use for their arguments. In addition, I hope this article’s points are illuminating and demonstrate that regardless of if you are a devotee of Rawls, you can take lessons from his work.

Against utilitarianism, in all its forms

In this section, I shall argue that if egalitarians follow Rawls and reject utilitarianism, as well as styles of argument for policies derived from it, they can strengthen their arguments to be less reliant on economic contingencies and thereby shift the focus of the debate to more favourable ground where they can invoke the strength of deep-set commitments.

Utilitarianism, in short, is the view that the right action is that which maximises the (average) satisfaction of preferences, i.e., maximally promotes (average) wellbeing. There is an easy story to tell which connects utilitarianism with a very common kind of political argument. If (averaged) preference-satisfaction determines what is right, as utilitarianism suggests, then policies which maximise (average) preference-satisfaction are to be pursued. Preference satisfaction is said to be a key element of economic behaviour: a basic assumption in much of economics is that people make decisions based on satisfying their preferences. Therefore, more economically-efficient outcomes maximise (average) preference-satisfaction. So, following utilitarian logic, the right thing for a government to do is to implement the most economically efficient policy. I call this an economics-first argument for a policy: where first and foremost the reasons to implement a policy are utilitarian-economic considerations of efficiency.

The above description may appear very abstract, so here is an example. The American egalitarian and radio host Sam Seder entertains viewers by inviting libertarians- supporters of a small state with minimal taxation and redistributive policies- to call into his show and argue with him. A common debate topic is whether America should adopt a public healthcare system (like the NHS in the UK). Seder always argues in favour, and the libertarians argue against. What I want to draw attention to are the sorts of arguments that Seder makes. He persistently argues from the economic efficiency of public healthcare versus privatised healthcare.

Seder’s line of argument may appear sensible. After all, there are strong economic arguments for universal healthcare. But there is a problem with the argument, which can be drawn out by engagement with Rawls’ work. Imagine some changes occurring in the world such that it becomes cheaper to run a private healthcare system than a public one: it becomes simply more efficient. Perhaps as a result of this efficiency, while many cannot access healthcare due to its cost, those who can access healthcare access far superior healthcare than in a public system. As such, the utilitarian-economic considerations would favour a private healthcare system. Yet, I suspect few egalitarians would endorse such a system, even under these conditions: on aggregate people may be more satisfied, but something seems wrong.

The discussion above is deliberately similar to a passage where Rawls criticises utilitarianism. Of course, utilitarian arguments – whether explicitly economic or not – can be used to justify granting basic freedoms (as John Stuart Mill’s work shows). But, as Rawls points out, such arguments are unavoidably contingent on particular facts, and it is not hard to imagine that utility could be maximised by certain infringements on basic rights and freedoms – say, that if freedom of association was ignored by outlawing unions, economic output could significantly rise. I suspect egalitarians would still wish to protect basic rights and freedoms even if utility were to be maximised by their erosion. It should be clear that this case is parallel to the universal healthcare one: in both cases, a utilitarian-economic argument can be made, but it seems worryingly dependent on contingent economic facts. We may generalise this, to say that many (if not all) utilitarian-economic arguments are similarly contingent. These arguments are thus found wanting for egalitarians.

So, what arguments can be made if not utilitarian-economic? Rawls’ work again gives a suggestion. Recall Rawls’ idea of the Original Position with its Veil of Ignorance. This can be seen as a powerful framing device for arguments about distributive justice: if you want to argue that such and such a policy is right, argue it would be agreed to in the Original Position (or, that a principle of justice would be agreed to in the Original Position, with your policy following from that principle). For example, consider Rawls’ argument for the First Principle of Justice, guaranteeing basic freedoms for all, from the Original Position. Rawls’ argument, in short, is that free and equal people would settle on a principle guaranteeing basic freedoms to allow them to live their preferred life-plans, and that as equals they could not ask someone else to accept less freedom for their benefit. Following his lead, similar arguments can be made in other areas: returning to the topic of universal healthcare, the Rawlsian political philosopher Norman Daniels argues that the principle of fair equality of opportunity gives a justification of universal healthcare. If access to healthcare determines opportunities, and free and equal people would agree to have fair equality of opportunity, then all deserve equal access to healthcare.

So, Rawls also gives egalitarians a different form of argument, which involves deep-set commitments directly. I would suggest that this style of argument is advantageous for egalitarians in three ways. First, it allows egalitarians to defend their preferred policies even if economic considerations weigh against them. Second, it allows egalitarians to argue for their principles in a grounded, powerful way. It is not that Rawls simply believes in the significance of the liberties, but that a central part of politics – the idea of the citizen as free and equal – lends support to a principle guaranteeing basic liberties to all. Similarly, Daniels’ view is not just that he prefers universal healthcare to private healthcare, but that if people are truly equal then there should be fair equality of opportunity, and since healthcare is a guarantor of opportunity, universal healthcare should be adopted. Third, this style of argument can “force the issue”: the opponent of an egalitarian may now have to argue, for example, that people are not free and equal. This is a better position for the egalitarian to be in – the debate is now over fundamental issues, not contingent economic facts.

So, to summarise, engagement with Rawls’ work against utilitarianism and his own replacement for utilitarianism as the way to justify policies provides a key lesson: it allows egalitarians to strengthen their arguments by utilising their deeply-held convictions, not contingent economic facts.

Society, natural talents, and deservingness

In this section, I shall demonstrate that Rawls’ view of natural talents provides a comprehensive response, which egalitarians could utilise in public debate, to a common argument made against progressive taxation.

Consider a typical argument against increased taxes on the rich. One  argument goes roughly as follows. Some people have such and such a skill – it is theirs – perhaps, they can be said to own it. This skill is worth however much on the market, which is to say that people are willing to pay however much in exchange for that skill to be used for the payer’s benefit. So, what is paid to them is rightly theirs – they deserve it, as it is derived in a legitimate way from a skill they legitimately have. Thus, if the government were to come along and tax this money off of them, a wrong has occurred – the person deserves the money, but the government has it instead of them. Perhaps some taxation is required – to maintain the army, the courts, or the police force – but, since it is wrong, it should be kept to a minimum, those holding this view allege. Arguments similar to these could support some policies proposed in British politics: consider Liz Truss’ now-infamous proposal to lift the cap on bankers’ bonuses, or Kemi Badenoch’s proposal to reduce taxes for the wealthy overall, by implementing a “flat tax”. The view sketched above could support both policies. This argument is thus odious to egalitarians, since it would increase inequality. Therefore, egalitarians need a good response – and I believe they can turn to Rawls to find it. In short, engaging with Rawls allows egalitarians to argue back: “they don’t deserve these skills, so they don’t deserve their position in the social system. As such, taxing their money is perfectly justifiable, as it is for society to decide how wealthy they should be”.

Analysing the skills which people possess, Rawls comes to refer to them as “natural talents”. In this, he says that we possess our skills by accident. These may be literally genetic as in the case of height – some people are born with the right genes to be tall, some are born with the right genes to be short. They may also come from complex processes in childhood- say, your reading ability was boosted by your parents giving you books to read, or your typing ability was boosted by your parents allowing you access to a computer from a young age. Perhaps effort too is a natural talent, says Rawls: having the right circumstances where effort is rewarded at a young age perhaps means good habits are formed for the rest of your life. 

Of course, there is a distribution of these natural talents in society – some have more, some have less. Rawls draws the link between your place in the distribution of talents and your earning ability later in life. If a society is broadly meritocratic, a more skilled person (i.e. someone who possesses more natural talents) will get to a higher position, and presumably earn a higher wage. This allows for an initial critique of the argument presented: where the anti-egalitarian says that the person legitimately possesses their skills and that these allow for their earning potential, we may say that the real determinant of earning potential is their place in the distribution of skills and so the question is whether they legitimately deserve that. 

This initial critique allows for a Rawlsian coup de grace. In a characteristic underplaying of his own ingenuity, Rawls introduces the “moral truism” that we do not deserve our place in the distribution of natural talents. Our talents (and their relative size compared to the talents of others) are, by definition, unearned. This revelation is undeniable – you do not earn the family you were born in, nor your height, and so on. Of course, this does not mean you should be forbidden from using your talents, but it does mean that you do not really deserve your place in the meritocratic society – insofar as you gained your position through your unique possession of certain natural talents, you do not really deserve to be in that position. This is a severe blow to the argument presented above. The supposedly easy-to-tell story which connects the possession of talents to differing outcomes is now problematic. The more-talented do not simply deserve more wealth, since they don’t deserve their place in the distribution of talents. Specifically, they may unavoidably possess their skill, but they do not deserve it.

This is already a powerful result, but it is worth noting here that he also fends off a potential counter-reply which could be raised at this stage. The anti-egalitarian could at this point respond that, while we do not actually deserve – i.e. we have not earned – our place in the distribution of talents, we nonetheless possess a legitimate moral claim (for whatever reason) on what the use of our talents can bring. This would be problematic for egalitarians – not only would it resurrect the argument against progressive taxation but it would be a difficult idea itself to rebut. However, Rawls gives an ingenious reply. Recall that Rawls’ idea of justification for principles of justice is that they are acceptable to all, regardless of their place in society. In his later work, he developed this into the idea that justification of principles of justice must not refer to “comprehensive doctrines” – views of morality and the good life. This, he argues, is because we unavoidably differ on moral issues such that no workable political system could be justified to all on those grounds. Naturally, this idea excludes the moral concept of deservingness invoked in the counter-reply under consideration here. This furnishes egalitarians with a response: you cannot invoke such moral concepts of deservingness for justifying political principles. 

In a characteristic underplaying of his own ingenuity, he introduces the “moral truism” that we do not deserve our place in the distribution of natural talents.

Having established that the argument against progressive taxation is problematised by Rawls’ comments on natural talents, it is worth noting that Rawls also gives egalitarians a way to argue positively for progressive taxation. Consider this question: what wealth should people have, if we do not (factually and for the purposes of political justification) morally deserve a certain level of wealth? To answer this, Rawls introduces the concept of a legitimate expectation to serve as a political equivalent to the moral idea of deservingness. A legitimate expectation is the amount of wealth someone is entitled to under the rules of cooperation which society is organised around. The idea is that if the reward for your work is said by the rules of cooperation to be £X per hour, and you work 5 hours, you are legitimately entitled to £5X. 

The question, then, is what rules should organise social cooperation. This gives a foothold for justifying progressive taxation – if you can show that it follows from the rules we ought to adopt. On this issue, Rawls’ argument is that the right rules are those which everyone could agree to from the standpoint of being free and equal, and then that the content of those rules is that inequalities in income and wealth must work to the benefit of everyone, especially the worst off. While you may disagree with Rawls’ specific answer – perhaps you think there should be an absolute limit on inequalities, rather than just requiring inequalities to maximise the wealth of the worst-off – this is nonetheless a powerful response.

To summarise, Rawls allows egalitarians to press the point that natural inequalities (such as of talents) cannot be translated without further justification into social inequalities (of income and wealth). An extra justification is needed: the inequality must be agreeable to all. In other words, Rawls’ argument brings inequalities of wealth under the control of society: in essence saying to the rich “if you wish to amass great wealth, it must be for reasons we can all accept, since you cannot claim you simply deserve it”. So, using Rawls, egalitarians can argue that the very rich can only amass such wealth if it is for the good of society as a whole.

Conclusion

This article has introduced some key elements of Rawls’ political philosophy and identified two parts I believe contain powerful tools and lessons for egalitarians. The first tool is primarily aimed at strengthening egalitarian arguments. The second is a powerful rejoinder to inegalitarian views of sharp divides in wealth being untouchable by governments. The key takeaway from the first section is that engagement with political philosophy can help us to identify weaknesses in our arguments, and develop new ones which are stronger. The point I wish to stress from the second section is that political philosophy can contain incredibly powerful ideas and arguments which can be utilised in public debate. Together, these sections suggest that Rawls – a philosopher whose work started over 70 years ago now, and who has not been with us for over 20 – can still give powerful lessons to egalitarians. If you want to give egalitarian arguments the best possible chance of succeeding, perhaps you should engage with political philosophy dating just as far back as Rawls, if not longer. 

References & Further Reading

Thank you to the University of York Politics Department’s Gabriele Badano for helpful comments on the initial draft of this article.

The material on utilitarianism is drawn from Rawls’ comments throughout chapters 1 and 3 of ‘A Theory of Justice’. Rawls’ discussion of natural talents can be found in chapter 2 of ‘A Theory’, as well as part 2 of ‘Justice as Fairness’. The idea of justificatory neutrality between conceptions of the good is implicit in ‘A Theory’ but particularly developed in ‘Political Liberalism’, especially in ‘Lecture VI: The Idea of Public Reason’ and the essay ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, which can be found in the Revised Edition of ‘Political Liberalism’. Daniels’ article referenced here is a succinct exposition of his views.

Daniels, N. (2001) Justice, Health, and Healthcare. The American Journal of Bioethics. 1(2), 2–16. Available at: doi:10.1162/152651601300168834.

Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. (2001). Justice As Fairness: A Restatement. Kelly, E. (ed). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. (2005). Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University Press.