The York Politics Review

(Photo: CCL)

By James Loughton – Contributor

On April 14th two planes charted by the International Committee of the Red Cross landed in opposing directions. One landing in Sanna, the former capital of Yemen has been held under Houthi control since 2014. The other landed in the city of Aden, the relocated capital. On board, each plane were detainees belonging to opposing sides of a war that UNICEF and Human Rights Watch have called the “largest humanitarian crisis in the world”. As these prisoners of war stepped onto the tarmac, freed from captivity, and returned to their homes after years of suffering, the world watches in hope that finally a peaceful resolution can be found for Yemen. A resolution for this conflict however does not exist within the confines of Yemen’s borders; this proxy war serves its role as part of a larger cold war that has dominated the Middle East for decades. The Saudi-Iranian proxy conflict is entering its final stage.

Since these initial prisoner swaps, over 900 captives have been exchanged. The result of ongoing talks between Saudi diplomats and representatives of the Houthi militant group who have been waging war since Ridya launched an invasion of the country in 2014. Meanwhile, 2000 kilometers north Saudi diplomats have landed in Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Ending twelve years of severed ties between the two nations and paving the way for Syria’s return to the Arab League. Assad’s isolation within the Arab world, a consequence of the dictator’s brutal repression of opposition protests in 2011 that spawned into chaotic civil war, may have finally ended. What unites both the Houthis and the Syrian government is their shared reliance on Iranian economic, military, and diplomatic support. Pawns in a multi-layered shadow war between Ridya and Tehran, each vying for regional hegemony exacerbated by religious differences. Therefore it is no coincidence that these political resolutions in Yemen and Syria follow the restoration of ties between Saudis and Iranians, brokered through a Chinese-led round of peace talks. The two heavyweights of the Middle East are attempting to resolve their deadly rivalry, so how did we get here?

In 1979, a popular uprising toppled the Shah of Iran, replacing his dynasty with a new form of regime. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rose to power establishing himself as Supreme Leader of a theocratic Iran, with the nation’s new purpose to establish regional dominance through Shia Islam. This immediately shocked Saudi Arabia, traditionally seeing itself as the leader of the Muslim world. Lacking the oil resources that brought wealth and influence to the Gulf states, Iran sought to establish its power by influencing Shia communities and backing militant groups throughout the Muslim world. Both Sunni and Shia Islamist groups, inspired by the Iranian Revolution’s calls for an end to traditional monarchies, launched uprisings. In 1979 the extremist militia, Ikhwan, besieged Masjid al-Haram, the holiest Islamic site in the city of Mecca. That same year the Shia Islamist group, OIRAP, launched an uprising in the Eastern Province against the Saudi government. Believing these militants to have received direct support from the Ayatollah, the Saudi government encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, culminating in the 1980 Iraqi-Iran war.

Despite an attempt to ease tensions by both nations during the 1990s, the consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq provided both sides with new opportunities to expand their influence and control. Iran’s anti-western orientation and refusal to bend the knee to American geopolitical aims naturally aligned Ridyah with Washington. Thus post-Saddam Iraq served as a proxy battleground, with Shia militant groups resisting the American occupation. Iran provided support for the Peace Companies in their 2004 uprising; support was further developed into the creation of a united Shia force (the Popular Mobilisation Forces) against ISIL. Saudis’ initially provided support to pro-American forces and have since become a strong backer of Islamist groups who fear Iranian dominance over Iraq, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr for example. Ridya and Tehran taking opposing sides in neighboring conflicts became a regular occurrence. In Syria the rivals squared off after civil war erupted, Iran providing Assad with military support and financial backing, whilst Saudi Arabia maintained close ties to the Syrian opposition. Lobbying fellow Arab states to isolate Damascus. In Lebanon, Iran has long held close ties to Hezbollah, a commanding force over Shia politics in the region which in 2022, declared Saudi Arabia’s King Salman a source of “terrorism”. Yemen has provided the clearest example of how deadly this rivalry has become with Saudi soldiers directly fighting against defiant Iranian-backed Houthi militants.

Diplomatic disputes reached their zenith in 2016 when Saudi Arabia broke off all relations in response to protestors storming its embassy in Tehran. This demonstration was a reaction to the execution of Shia clerics by Saudi authorities. Fast forward to March 2023 and both sides have agreed to re-open embassies and implement economic and security cooperation deals, with more talks to follow. The reasonings for this realignment are multifaceted. Iran desires a restored relationship with the larger Arab world, the recent restoration of ties with the UAE being a further example. Western sanctions have crippled Iran’s economic output, and although slowly recovering from a -3.1% decline in GDP in 2019, Iran is still suffering from high inflation and increasing unemployment. This economic instability decreases the amount of support Iran can provide for its proxy groups in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Meanwhile, domestically Iran has been hit with continuous mass protests; water shortages in 2021 and price hikes in food in 2022 catalyzing large demonstrations in defense of civil rights. The murder of Mahsa Amini has resulted in demonstrations across the nation that the regime has so far been unable to contain. Iran needs to have guarantees of foreign policy stability to resolve domestic issues.

Saudi Arabia’s rationale for a diplomatic conflict is also one of necessity. The Fall of Kabul in 2021 made it clear that American hegemony over the region was gone. Although Saudis have maintained ties to the Taliban, the undermining of American authority hurts its ability to justify compliance with Western-aligned foreign policy. The kingdom’s relations with Israel, backed by Western powers, have been logical. Both see combating Iranian-backed militant groups as a priority, both oppose Iran developing nuclear weaponry and both oppose the Syrian government. However, the shadowy cooperation between the two has pushed Palestinian militants closer to Iran, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh claimed last year that Iran has provided the majority of funding for its rockets. Violence has rapidly escalated in Palestine, galvanizing the Muslim world in opposition to Israeli authorities storming the Al-Aqsa mosque earlier this month. For Saudi Arabia to maintain its position as leader of the Muslim world it must reclaim its influence over Palestine (senior representatives of Hamas visited Ridyha on April 16th), improved relations with Iran are therefore key to leveraging pressure over Israel.

Finally, the most pressing need for détente is the devastating failure of Saudi Arabia’s invasion of Yemen. Houthis have targeted oil facilities within the kingdom, driving up oil prices, and questioning its ability to defend its citizens from attacks. Saudi-backed government forces have been engaged in conflict with their former allies, the Southern Transitional Council, strengthening the position of the Houthis whilst 80% of the Yemeni population now require desperate humanitarian aid. The scales of Yemen have tipped in Iran’s favor, and the Saudis have backed themselves into a corner leaving diplomacy as the only possible solution.

Both nations have strong economic visions for the future, the Saudi socioeconomic development plan known as ‘Vision 2030’ aimed at investing billions into the modernization of the nation and its neighbors. Iran has committed itself to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, hedging its bets on China economically combating the United States in Afghanistan and Central Asia. For both powers any escalation of conflict puts their futures at great risk, the time of proxy warfare has seemingly come to its end. China’s role in mediating is natural, both nations seek membership in the Chinese-led SCO economic alliance, and China’s publicly neutral position on the Israel-Palestine and Ukraine conflicts will reassure Ridyah and Tehran that neither will receive an unfavorable position. Many are skeptical of how soon a peaceful resolution can be found in Yemen and Syria; peace deals in the Middle East having a reputation for their inability to put words into action. China’s domestic issues and the repressive nature of both the Saudi and Iranian regimes provides little reassurance that humanitarianism will be put first. However, if these talks can allow for greater humanitarian efforts to bypass sanctions and conflict lines. If it allows for the starving children in Yemen and the wartorn victims of the Syrian Civil War, now dealing with an earthquake catastrophe, to finally receive the aid they deserve. Then these talks signify a positive development in the new order of Middle Eastern politics.